









How	 does	 mathematics	 apply	 to	 something	 non-mathematical?	 We	
distinguish	between	a	general	application	problem	and	a	special	application	
problem.	 A	 critical	 examination	 of	 the	 answer	 that	 structural	 mapping	
accounts	offer	 to	the	 former	problem	leads	us	to	 identify	a	 lacuna	 in	these	
accounts:	 they	have	 to	 presuppose	 that	 target	 systems	 are	 structured	 and	













phenomena	with	Hilbert	 spaces;	 population	biologists	 represent	predator-prey	
systems	 using	 coupled	 differential	 equations;	 and	 economists	 represent	 the	
beliefs	 and	 desires	 of	 human	 agents	 with	 real-valued	 functions.	 The	 question	
then	 is:	 how	 does	 mathematics	 apply	 to	 the	 physical	 and	 social	 worlds?	 This	
question	 has	 been	 on	 the	 horizon	 at	 least	 since	 Galileo	 (1623/1957,	 p.	 238)	
noted	that	the	book	of	nature	was	written	in	the	language	of	mathematics,	and	it	
acquired	notoriety	when	Wigner	declared	 that	 the	 “unreasonable	 effectiveness	
of	mathematics”	in	science	was	“something	bordering	on	the	mysterious	and	that	
there	 is	 no	 explanation	 for	 it”	 (1960,	 p.	 2).	 The	 question	 is	 central	 to	 the	
philosophy	of	science	but	has	implications	beyond,	for	example	in	the	philosophy	
of	 mathematics	 where	 the	 Quine-Putnam	 indispensability	 argument	 takes	 the	
successful	 application	 of	 mathematics	 in	 science	 to	 deliver	 ontological	
conclusions	regarding	the	status	of	mathematical	entities.		
	
A	 prominent	 answer	 to	 the	 question	 has	 emerged	 within	 the	 structuralist	
approach	to	the	nature	of	scientific	theories.	The	basic	idea	of	this	account,	which	
Pincock	 (2004)	 aptly	 calls	 the	 mapping	 account,	 is	 that	 a	 theory	 provides	
mathematical	structures	and	that	these	structures	apply	to	the	physical	world	in	









morphism)	 that	 relates	 the	 mathematical	 structure	 with	 the	 structure	 of	 the	
physical	 system(s)	 to	 which	 the	 theory	 applies.	 	 The	 aim	 of	 this	 paper	 is	 to	
examine	 this	account	of	 the	application	of	mathematics.	Our	conclusion	will	be	
that	 it	 offers	 only	 a	 partial	 answer.	 For	 such	 morphisms	 to	 be	 well-defined,	
physical	 systems	 need	 to	 exhibit	 structures	 and	 without	 an	 account	 of	 where	
these	 structures	 come	 from	 the	 account	 remains	 incomplete.	 In	 this	 paper	we	
provide	 a	 positive	 answer,	 namely	 that	 these	 structures	 are	 the	 result	 of	
abstracting	 away	 the	 physical	 aspects	 of	 what	 we	 call	 structure	 generating	
descriptions:	descriptions	of	physical	 systems	 that	 refer	 to	physical	objects	and	
physical	 properties	 and	 relations.	 We	 call	 this	 the	 extensional	 abstraction	
account.	
	
We	proceed	as	 follows.	 In	Section	2	we	point	out	that	there	 is	no	such	thing	as	
“the”	 problem	 of	 the	 application	 of	 mathematics	 and	 distinguish	 between	
multiple	intertwined	problems	concerning	the	use	of	mathematics	in	science.	In	
Section	3	we	introduce	the	mapping	account	and	present	what	we	take	to	be	the	
strongest	 formulation	 of	 it.	 In	 Section	 4	 we	 examine	 existing	 suggestions	 of	
where	the	physical	structures	needed	for	the	mapping	account	might	be	found,	
and	 argue	 that	 they	 don’t	 stand	 up	 to	 scrutiny.	 In	 Section	 5	 we	 present	 a	
suggestion	of	how	to	fill	this	gap,	and	in	Section	6	we	offer	concluding	remarks	
concerning	mathematical	 explanation,	 nominalism,	 and	how	our	 account	 could	






Representations	 of	 target	 systems	 offered	 by	 scientific	 models	 and	 theories	
crucially	 involve	 mathematical	 structures.3	These	 mathematical	 structures	 are	
applied	to	physical	systems	in	a	way	that	allows	scientists	to	convert	reasoning	
about	 the	 structures	 into	 reasoning	 about	 the	 systems	 to	 which	 they	 apply.	
Consider	 the	 simple	 example	 of	 a	 population	 of	 rabbits.	 Suppose	 you	want	 to	
know	 how	 fast	 the	 population	 grows	 and	 to	 this	 end	 you	 construct	 a	
mathematical	 model	 of	 the	 population.	 One	 way	 to	 reason	 about	 such	 a	
population	 is	 to	 count	 the	 rabbits	 at	 a	 particular	 time,	 observe	 their	 breeding	
behaviour,	and	then	formulate	a	rule	about	how	the	population	grows.	A	simple	
rule	is	that	the	rabbits	form	discrete	generations	and	that	the	population	doubles	
every	 time	 a	 new	 generation	 appears	 (for	 instance	 every	 six	 months).	 Under	
these	 assumptions	 the	 growth	 of	 the	 population	 is	 given	 by	 the	 rule	 nt+1 = 2nt 	





with	 mathematical	 structures	 (for	 a	 discussion	 of	 these	 issues	 see	 our	 (2017)).	 Our	 point	 of	
departure	here	is	the	hopefully	uncontroversial	observation	that	whatever	does	the	representing	
often	involves	mathematics.			




In	 formulating	 this	 model,	 a	 mathematical	 structure,	 in	 this	 case	 the	 natural	
numbers	 with	 a	 particular	 function	 defined	 on	 them,	 has	 been	 applied	 to	 a	
physical	 system,	 and	 this	 made	 it	 possible	 to	 convert	 reasoning	 about	 the	
structure	 into	 reasoning	 about	 the	 physical	 system	 itself.	 This	 invites	 the	






The	general	application	problem	 is	 this:	 in	 virtue	 of	what	 does	 a	mathematical	
structure	 apply	 to	 a	 target	 system?	 Two	 qualifications	 are	 needed.	 First,	 the	
structure	 referred	 to	 in	 the	question	could	be	any	mathematical	 structure.	The	
emphasis	 of	 question	 is:	 how	 does	mathematics	 hook	 onto	 something	 that	 (at	




way	 that	 the	 claims	 that	 the	 mathematics	 can	 be	 used	 to	 generate	 about	 the	
physical	system	are	false.5	The	above	example	is	a	case	in	point	as	the	equation	
implies	 that	 the	 population	 continues	 to	 grow	 indefinitely,	 but	 of	 course	 the	
population	won’t	 grow	 indefinitely	because	 limited	 resources	will	 put	 a	bound	
on	 its	 size.6	To	regiment	usage,	we	will	use	 “apply”	 (and	 its	cognates)	 in	a	way	
that	is	neutral	with	respect	to	whether	or	not	the	application	at	hand	generates	
true	or	 false	 claims.	Where	 the	application	generates	 truths	we	use	 the	phrase	
“successful	 application”	 and	 where	 it	 generates	 falsehoods	 the	 phrase	





(type	of)	target	system?	In	this	vein	one	can	ask,	 for	 instance,	 in	virtue	of	what	









5	Generating	 a	 strictly	 speaking	 false	 claim	 does	 not	 imply	 that	 the	 application	 is	 completely	
unsuccessful.	Falsity	comes	 in	degrees,	and	so	does	being	an	unsuccessful	application.	There	 is	
clearly	a	 sense	 in	which	 some	applications	of	mathematics	generate	 claims	about	 systems	 that	
are	only	approximately	 true	 (e.g.	Newton’s	use	of	 calculus	 to	describe	planetary	motions),	 and	






rational	 numbers?	 The	 real	 numbers?	 What	 sort	 of	 function(s)	 should	
correspond	 to	 their	physical	 interbreeding	relations?	Should	 they	be	bounded?	
And	 so	 on.	 There	 are	multiple	 decisions	 to	 be	made	when	 determining	which	
mathematical	structure	should	be	applied	to	a	system	in	question,	and	how.		
	
There	 is	 a	 third	 problem	 that	 is	 often	 mentioned	 in	 connection	 with	 the	
applicability	 of	 mathematics:	 in	 virtue	 of	 what,	 if	 at	 all,	 do	 facts	 about	
mathematical	 structures	 explain	 physical	 facts?	 We	 call	 this	 the	 explanation	
problem.	This	problem	is	of	interest	for	at	least	two	reasons.	Firstly,	philosophers	
of	 science	 are	 interested	 in	 what	 scientific	 explanation	 is	 and	 the	 question	 of	
how,	 if	 at	 all,	 mathematics	 can	 function	 explanatory	 has	 implications	 for	 this	
broader	debate.	Second,	the	recent	literature	on	indispensability	arguments	for	a	
commitment	to	the	existence	of	mathematical	objects	has	focussed	explicitly	on	
whether	 or	 not	 mathematics	 plays	 an	 essential	 explanatory	 role,	 rather	 than	
merely	 featuring	 in	 our	 “best	 scientific	 theories”	 as	 per	 the	 original	 Quine-
Putnam	formulation	(for	a	clear	statement	of	this	see	Baker’s	(2009,	Section	2)).	
	
It	 is	 worth	 noting	 that	 the	 application	 problem,	 even	 if	 phrased	 in	 terms	 of	
successful	application,	 is	conceptually	prior	 to	 the	explanation	problem.	Before	
asking	whether	or	not	a	fact	about	a	mathematical	structure	explains	some	fact	
about	 a	 physical	 system	 we	 need	 to	 know	 whether	 or	 not	 the	 mathematical	
structure	applies	to	the	system	in	question.	The	examples	in	the	recent	literature	
–	e.g.	whether	or	not	facts	about	prime	numbers	are	essential	 in	explaining	the	




(Lyon	 and	 Colyvan	 2008)	 –	 all	 presuppose	 that	 the	 relevant	 mathematical	





few	 remarks	 about	 the	 specific	 problem	 on	 the	 way	 and	 briefly	 touch	 on	 the	






The	 core	 idea	 of	 what	 has	 become	 known	 as	 the	mapping	 account	 is	 that	 a	
mathematical	 structure	 applies	 to	 a	 target	 system	 in	 virtue	 of	 there	 being	 a	
proposed	 structure-preserving	 mapping	 from	 the	 target	 system	 to	 the	
mathematical	 structure.	The	mathematical	 structure	 successfully	applies	 to	 the	




The	 mapping	 account	 is	 phrased	 in	 terms	 of	 mathematical	 structures	 and	 it’s	
	 5	
important	 to	 be	 explicit	 about	 the	 notion	 of	 structure	 this	 presupposes. 7	
Structures	 are	 taken	 to	 be	 set-theoretic	 structures	 as	 used	 in	 logic	 and	model	
theory.	A	structure	in	that	sense	is	a	composite	entity	consisting	of	a	nonempty	
set	U 	of	objects	called	the	domain	(or	universe)	of	the	structure	and	a	nonempty	
indexed	set	R 	of	relations	 r 	on	U .	 It	 is	convenient	 to	write	 the	structure	as	an	
ordered	 tuple	S = U,R .8	For	 what	 follows	 it	 is	 important	 to	 be	 clear	 on	 the	




It	 is	 irrelevant	what	the	relation	“in	 itself”	 is.	All	 that	matters	 from	a	structural	
point	 of	 view	 is	 between	 which	 objects	 it	 holds.	 For	 this	 reason,	 a	 relation	 is	
specified	 purely	 extensionally,	 that	 is,	 as	 class	 of	 ordered	 n-tuples	 and	 the	




Assume	now	 that	we	want	 to	 apply	 the	 structure	SM 	to	 a	 target	 system	T .	 On	
the	mapping	 account	 this	 involves	 proposing	 a	mapping	 f :T → SM 	such	 that	 f	
preserves	at	least	some	of	the	structure	of	T.	We	then	say	that	SM 	is	the	structure	
to	be	applied	and	that	 f 	is	the	mapping	that	anchors	 the	application	of	 SM .	The	
nature	 of	 f 	has	 been	 the	 subject	 matter	 of	 considerable	 debate	 with	
isomorphism,	isomorphic	embedding,	partial	isomorphism,	and	homomorphism	
being	 the	most	 common	 suggestions.9	We	 say	 that	SM 	and	T are	morphic	 if	 the	
proposed	morphism	relating	them	exists.		
	
This	 account	 of	 the	 applicability	 of	 mathematics	 is	 arguably	 implicit	 in	 many	
versions	 of	 the	 semantic	 view	 of	 theories,	 most	 notably	 in	 Suppes’,	 van	
Fraassen’s,	 the	 partial	 structures	 approach	 championed	 by	 Da	 Costa,	 French,	
Ladyman,	 and	 Bueno,	 and	 the	 Munich	 brand	 of	 structuralism	 due	 to	 Sneed,	
Stegmüller,	 Balzer	 and	 Moulines.10	Recent	 explicit	 statements	 and	 defences	 of	
the	 account	 have	 been	 offered	 by	 Pincock	 (2007,	 2004,	 2012)	 and	 Bueno	 and	
Colyvan	 (2011).	 For	 our	 current	 purposes	 we	 focus	 on	 Bueno	 and	 Colyvan’s	
discussion	 because	 their	 statement	 of	 the	 view	 is	 particularly	 helpful	 for	 a	
discussion	of	the	issues	we	are	interested	in.11		
																																																								






to	 include	 a	 language	 and	 an	 interpretation	 function,	 which	 are	 absent	 from	 the	 notion	 of	 a	
structure	as	used	in	the	current	context.		
9	For	 a	 discussion	 of	 these	 see,	 for	 instance,	 Suppes’	 (1960),	 van	 Fraassen’s	 (1980,	 2008),	 Da	














(2) Derivation:	 “this	 step	 consists	 in	 drawing	 consequences	 from	 the	 mathematical	
formalism,	using	the	mathematical	structure	obtained	in	the	immersion	step	[…]	This	is,	
of	 course,	 the	 key	 point	 of	 the	 application	 process,	 where	 consequences	 from	 the	
mathematical	formalism	are	generated.”		
(3) Interpretation:	“finally	we	interpret	the	mathematical	consequences	that	were	obtained	
in	 the	 derivation	 step	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 initial	 empirical	 set	 up	 […]	 To	 establish	 an	
interpretation,	a	mapping	from	the	mathematical	structure	to	the	initial	empirical	set	up	
is	 needed.	 This	 mapping	 need	 not	 be	 simply	 the	 inverse	 of	 the	 mapping	 used	 in	 the	




In	 separating	 these	 three	 steps,	 Bueno	 and	 Colyvan	 elaborate	 on	 a	 simple	
mapping	 account	 in	 various	 important	 ways.	 Firstly,	 they	 are	 explicit	 that	 the	
choice	of	a	mapping	in	the	immersion	step	is	a	contextual	matter	and	therefore	
does	 not	 require	 that	 the	 same	 mapping	 (let	 alone	 isomorphism)	 be	 used	 in	
every	 instance	of	applying	mathematics.	This,	combined	with	 the	 fact	 that	 they	
allow	 for	 distinct	 mappings	 from,	 and	 to,	 the	 empirical	 set	 up	 allows	 for	
instances	 where	 the	mathematical	 structure	 contains	more	 structure	 than	 the	
empirical	one,	and	visa	versa	(ibid,	p.	356).12	Secondly,	they	argue	that	after	the	
immsersion	 step	 their	 account	 is	 flexible	 enough	 to	 accommodate	 multiple	
further	mappings	between	the	intitial	mathematical	structure	and	some	further	
structures,	and	 then	applying	 the	 further	 two	steps	 (ibid,	p.	354).	Thirdly,	 they	
argue	 that	 their	account	can	accommodate	 idealisations	via	 the	 introduction	of	
partial	 mappings	 (ibid,	 pp.	 356-363).	 Forthly,	 the	 argue	 that	 by	 allowing	 for	
pragmatic	and	contextual	considerations	to	determine	which	mapping	to	choose	
on	a	 case	by	case	basis	 they	make	 room	 for	 cases	where	novel	predictions	are	
generated	 by	 applying	mathematics.	 This	 happened,	 for	 instance,	 where	 Dirac	
choose	 to	 interpet	 negative	 solutions	 to	 the	 dirac	 equation	 as	 physically	








on	mappings	 to	 and	 from	 target	 systems	 and	mathematical	 structures,	 and	 in	 this	 sense	 is	 an	
advanced	version	of,	rather	than	an	alternative	to,	the	mapping	account.		
12	A	 related	point	 is	made	by	Weisberg	 (2013,	Section	3.3)	who	points	out	 that	 in	 cases	where	
mathematical	 structures	 are	 used	 to	 represent	 a	 physical	 system,	 an	 assignment	and	 intended	
scope	are	needed	to	specify	which	parts	of	the	structure	are	mapped	to	which	parts	of	the	target	
system.	Where	 the	structure	contains	parts	 that	don’t	 correspond	 to	any	purported	part	of	 the	
target	 system	(e.g.	where	 irrational	numbers	 satisfy	 the	Lotka-Volterra	equations)	 it	 should	be	
made	explicit	that	this	is	not	supposed	to	have	physical	import.		
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particular	 structure	 is	 applied	 (say,	 of	 how	 partial	 differential	 equations	 are	
applied	 to	 diffusion	 processes).	 The	 best	 a	 general	 account	 can	 do	 is	 offer	 a	
framework	for	the	analysis	of	specific	applications.	Bueno	and	Colyvan’s	account	
does	 exactly	 that.	 As	 they	 point	 out,	 the	 inherent	 flexibility	 and	 context	
sensitivity	of	their	framework	allows	them	to	account	for	Diarc’s	discovery	of	the	
positron;	why	we	 ignore	 negative	 solutions	 to	 quadratic	 equations	 in	 cases	 of	
predicating	 where	 a	 projectile	 will	 land;	 and	 the	 introduction	 of	 partial	




However,	 despite	 offering	 a	 framework	 in	 which	 to	 think	 about	 specific	
applications	 of	 mathematics,	 no	 complete	 answer	 to	 the	 general	 problem	
emerges	from	Bueno	and	Colyvan’s	account.	The	general	problem	is	addressed	in	
the	 first	 and	 the	 third	 steps	when	mappings	between	 the	empirical	 set	up	and	
convenient	 mathematical	 structures	 are	 established:	 every	 application	 of	






the	 target	 somehow	 exhibits	 a	 certain	 structure.	 Hence,	 formulated	 properly,	
applying	 structure	 SM requires	 defining	 a	 mapping	 f :ST → SM 	(and	 not	
f :T → SM )	 where	ST is	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 target.	 But	 what	 is	 the	 relation	








delivered	 by	 our	 theories,	 not	 by	 the	 world	 itself.	 What	 we	 require	 for	 the	 mapping	
account	to	get	started	is	something	like	a	pre-theoretic	structure	of	the	world	(or	at	least	
a	 pre-modeling	 structure	 of	 the	 world).	 This	 is	 clearly	 a	 problem	 for	 the	 mapping	
account	 […]	 the	mapping	 account	 does	 require	 having	 what	 we	 shall	 call	 an	 assumed	









this	 initial	 assumed	 structure	 as	 defeasible	 and	 let	 the	 resulting	 mathematical	 model	
help	 inform	 refinements	 or	 revisions	 to	 the	 initial	 assumed	 structure.	 The	 inferential	




structure	 to	 another	 mathematical	 structure,	 where	 the	 latter	 may	 be	 thought	 to	





flexibility,	 but	 this	 does	 not	 explain	 how	 a	 structure	 emerges	 from	 something	
non-structural	in	the	first	place.	To	revise	a	structure	presupposes	that	there	is	a	
structure	to	begin	with,	but	Bueno	and	Colyvan	have	little	to	say	about	where	the	
“assumed	 structure”	 comes	 from.	Likewise,	 Pincock	 signals	 awareness	of	 there	
being	 “an	 important	difference	between	 talking	 about	 a	 concrete	 system	made	
up	of	objects	and	linked	together	by	concrete	relations	involving	quantities	and	
properties	and	a	set-theoretic	structure”	(2012,	p.29),	but	then	says	little	about	












the	 target	 system.	Mathematics	 is	 not	 applied	 to	 a	mysterious	 structure	 of	 the	
system	itself,	but	to	a	data	model	that	results	from	performing	measurements	on	
the	system.	The	 idea	 that	data	might	provide	 the	required	target-end	structure	
originated	 in	 a	 different	 context,	 namely	 the	 issue	 of	 representation	 in	 the	 so-
called	 semantic	 view	 of	 theories.	 The	 idea	 is	 originally	 found	 in	 Suppes’	





can	 be	 treated	 as	 a	 relation	 defined	 over	ℝ,	 or	ℝn,	 or	 intervals	 thereof.	 These	
data	models	 are	 set	 theoretic	 structures,	 and	 therefore	 they	 can	enter	 into	 the	
morphisms	as	required	by	the	mapping	account.			
	
The	main	problem	 facing	 this	 idea	 is	 that	 if	 this	 is	 the	 end	of	 the	 story	 then	 it	
turns	out	that	mathematics	doesn’t	apply	to	the	physical	world	after	all	because	
data	 themselves	are	mathematical	objects	–	 in	 fact	 this	 is	what	allows	 them	 to	
play	the	required	role	of	the	“assumed	structure”	in	the	mapping	account.	So	the	






representation	 van	 Fraassen	 (2008)	 responds	 to	 this	 objection	 by	 invoking	
pragmatic	aspects	of	the	context	of	using	scientific	models.	In	the	language	of	the	
mapping	 account,	 the	 core	 of	 van	 Fraassen’s	 argument	 is	 that	 there	 is	 no	
pragmatic	 difference	 between	 taking	 a	 mathematical	 structure	 to	 apply	
accurately	 to	 a	physical	 system	and	accurately	 apply	 to	data	 extracted	 from	 it.	
Nguyen	(2016)	provides	a	critical	discussion	of	van	Fraassen’s	argument	in	the	










The	 second	 suggestion	 of	where	 to	 find	 the	 “assumed	 structure”	 of	 a	 physical	
system	is	more	radical.	One	could	simply	claim	that	physical	systems	themselves	
are	structures.	Prime	facie	this	seems	like	a	category	mistake:	structures	are	sets	
with	 relations	 and	 functions	 existentially	 defined	 upon	 them,	 and	 physical	
systems	 are	 not	 sets.	 However	 Tegmark	 (2008)	 argues	 the	 contrary.	 His	
argument	 proceeds	 from	 what	 looks	 like	 an	 innocuous	 claim:	 there	 exists	 an	
external	physical	reality	completely	independent	of	us	humans	(what	he	calls	the	
“external	 reality	 hypothesis”).	 He	 argues	 that	 this	 entails	 that	 the	 world	 is	 a	
mathematical	structure	(his	“mathematical	universe	hypothesis”).	His	argument	
for	 this	 is	 based	 on	 the	 notion	 that	 a	 so	 called	 “theory-of-everything”	must	 be	
expressible	in	a	form	that	is	devoid	of	human-centric	“baggage”	(by	the	external	






This	 approach	 stands	 or	 falls	 on	 the	 strengths	 of	 its	 premise	 that	 a	 complete	
theory	 of	 everything	 will	 be	 formulated	 purely	 mathematically,	 without	 any	
human	baggage,	which	in	turn	relies	on	a	strict	reductionist	account	of	scientific	
knowledge.	 We	 have	 doubts	 about	 a	 number	 of	 steps	 in	 this	 argument,	 in	
particular	 the	 validity	 of	 inference	 from	 the	 proposition	 that	 a	 theory	 of	
everything	 describes	 a	 mathematical	 structure	 to	 the	 conclusion	 that	 the	
external	 reality	 itself	 is	 a	 mathematical	 structure.	 However,	 an	 in-depth	




target	 system	 at	 the	 non-fundamental	 level.	 Arithmetic	 can	 be	 used	 to	 count	
objects	 on	 the	 desk;	 a	 biologist	 might	 use	 the	 Lotka-Volterra	 equations	 to	
generate	a	prediction	about	a	predator-prey	system;	an	economist	might	use	a	
pair	 of	 utility	 and	 probability	 functions	 that	 map	 to	 the	 real	 numbers	 to	
summarise	 someone’s	 choice	 behaviour;	 and	 so	 on.	 It	 is	 undeniable	 that	 these	
	 10	
are	 instances	 of	 applying	 mathematics.	 Yet	 these	 target	 systems	 are	 not	 a	
fundamental	 part	 of	 the	 world,	 nor	 do	 models	 of	 these	 objects	 have	 to	 make	
reference	 to	 their	 fundamental	constituents.	When	modelling	an	airplane	wing,	








target	 system	 shouldn’t	 be	 identified	with	 such	 a	 structure,	 then	 what	 other	
options	are	available?	We	take	it	that	the	idea	that	either	implicitly	or	explicitly	
underlies	 the	 mapping	 account	 is	 that	 target	 systems	 instantiate	 structures,	
where	 the	 instantiation	 relation	 that	 holds	 between	 a	 target	 system	 and	 a	
structure	is	supposed	to	be	the	sort	of	relation	that	holds	between	an	object	and	
a	property,	or	a	pair	of	objects	and	a	relation	they	enter	into.	This	comes	across	




“[On	 the	 structuralist	 account	of	mathematics]	 the	problem	of	 the	 relationship	
between	 mathematics	 and	 reality	 is	 a	 special	 case	 of	 the	 problem	 of	 the	
instantiation	 of	 universals.	 Mathematics	 is	 to	 reality	 as	 universal	 is	 to	
instantiated	 particular.	 As	 above,	 the	 ‘universal’	 here	 refers	 to	 a	 pattern	 or	




Let	 us	 then	 assume	 that	 a	 structure	S 	defines	 a	 universal.	 The	main	 question	
then	 is:	 under	what	 conditions	 does	 a	 target	 instantiate	 a	 certain	 structure	S ?	
The	details	here	might	depend	on	which	account	of	universals	one	adopts,	but	
what	 all	 answers	 would	 seem	 to	 have	 in	 common	 is	 the	 following.	 Since	 a	
structure	 consists	 of	 a	 set	 of	 objects	 with	 relations	 on	 them,	 the	 target	T
instantiates	structure	ST 	iff	T consists	of	individuals	that	make	up	the	domain	of	
ST 	and	enter	into	the	relations	that	are	specified	in	 R .		
	
Natural	 as	 this	 may	 sound,	 this	 definition	 faces	 an	 immediate	 problem.	 The	
problem	is	Newman’s	objection	to	Russell’s	structural	realism	(Newman	1928).	
The	essential	point	of	the	objection	is	that	for	any	structure	S = U,R 	where	the	
cardinality	 of	U 	is	 k ,	 a	 target	 system	 consisting	 of	 k 	objects	 instantiates	 a	
																																																								
14	A	similar	position	is	found	in	Resnik’s	(1997,	p.	204).	Due	to	the	fact	that	some	mathematical	
structures	 are	 not	 instantiated	 by	 any	 physical	 system,	 Shapiro	 further	 distinguishes	 between	
whether	 or	 not	 structures	 as	 universals	 should	 be	 thought	 of	 as	 ante	 rem	 universals,	 in	 re	
universals	(eliminative	structuralism)	or	in	modal	terms	(Shapiro	1997).	These	distinctions	are	
immaterial	to	our	question.	A	word	of	warning	about	terminology	is	in	order	here.	Shapiro	often	
uses	 the	 term	 “exemplified”	 to	 refer	 to	 the	 relationship	 between	 a	 universal	 and	 a	 physical	





relations	matching	 the	 relations	 in	 R 	in	 terms	of	n-tuples	 of	 the	 objects	 in	 the	
target	 system.15	So	 if	we	 think	about	 instantiation	 in	 this	way,	 then	we	are	 left	
with	 the	 fact	 that	 a	 target	 system	 instantiates	 any	 structure	 that	 has	 the	
cardinality	of	the	target.		
	
We	 are	 now	 faced	with	 an	 identification	 problem.	 Recall	 Bueno	 and	 Colyvan’s	
first	 step,	 immersion,	 which	 consists	 in	 “establishing	 a	 mapping	 from	 the	
empirical	set	up	to	a	convenient	mathematical	structure”	(op	cit.).	To	establish	a	
mapping	 it	 is	 not	 enough	 to	 show	 that	 there	 exists	 some	 structure	 ST in	 the	
target	such	that	there	exists	some	mapping	 f 	from	ST to	SM .	Applying	a	certain	
structure	SM requires,	as	Bueno	and	Colyvan	aptly	put	it,	establishing	a	mapping.	
This,	 in	 turn,	 involves	 identifying	 a	 particular	 structure	 ST in	 the	 target	 and	
constructing	 a	mapping	 f 	from	that	structure	 to	SM ,	 the	structure	 that	 is	 to	be	
applied.	 Or	 to	 put	 it	 another	 way,	 applying	SM is	 an	 agent-based	 notion	 –	 it’s	
something	that	a	scientist	does	(which	ties	in	with	Bueno	and	Colyvan’s	emphasis	
on	 pragmatic	 factors).	 To	 apply	 a	 structure	SM 	to	 a	 target	 the	 scientist	 has	 to	
single	out	a	particular	target	structure	and	explicitly	construct	the	mapping	 f 	by	
matching	up	elements	in	the	domains	of	the	structures	and	pairing	up	relations.	
If	 there	 was	 only	 one	 structure	 in	 target	 –	 if	 there	 was	 such	 a	 thing	 as	 “the”	
structure	of	 the	 target	–	 then	 there	was	no	question	 about	 this	 choice	 and	 the	
remaining	 issue	 would	 only	 be	 how	 exactly	 the	 scientist	 gains	 access	 to	 that	
structure.	But	faced	with	the	Newmanian	abundance	of	structures,	the	scientist	




sensible	 assumptions	 about	 the	 system	 are	 made	 the	 underdetermination	 is	
resolved.	 This	 is	 in	 effect	 the	 route	 taken	 by	 the	 standard	 ways	 of	 blocking	
Newman’s	 objection,	 which	 involve	 appeal	 to	 natural	 kinds	 in	 one	 way	 or	
other.16	One	 may	 have	 all	 kind	 of	 quibbles	 about	 natural	 kinds,	 but	 let	 us	 set	
these	 aside	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 argument.	 It	 is	 our	 contention	 that	 even	 if	 natural	
kinds	 are	 assumed	 to	 be	 unproblematic,	 an	 appeal	 to	 them	 is	 not	 sufficient	 to	
resolve	 the	 remaining	 underdetermination	 issues.	 Let	 us	 illustrate	 this	 point	
with	 an	 example,	 the	 methane	 molecule.17	The	 molecule	 consists	 of	 a	 carbon	
atom	 and	 four	 hydrogen	 atoms	 grouped	 around	 it,	 forming	 a	 tetrahedron.	
Between	 each	 hydrogen	 atom	 and	 the	 carbon	 atom	 there	 is	 a	 covalent	 bond.	
																																																								
15	For	 a	 detailed	 discussion	 of	 the	 theorem	 see	 Ketland’s	 (2004).	 However,	 the	 basic	 point	 is	
straightforward	 and	 can	 shown	 as	 follows.	 Let	 〈U , R〉 	be	 a	 structure	 such	 that	 |U |= k .	 Let	
 T ={x1,...,xk} 	be	a	set	consisting	of	the	 k 	objects	from	the	target	system.	Since	 |T |=|U |= k 	
there	is	a	bijection	 f :T →U .	Using	this	bijection,	for	each	 ri ∈R ,	we	can	construct	a	set	 r 'i 	
consisting	 of	 n-tuples	 of	 objects	 from	  T 	as	 follows:	  
{〈xi ,...,x j 〉 : 〈 f (xi ),..., f (x j )〉 ∈ri}. 	






molecule	 in	 these	 terms	 does,	 however,	 not	 fix	 a	 structure	 uniquely.	 	 One	 can	
regard	 the	 atoms	 as	 objects	 and	 the	 bonds	 are	 relations.	 Denoting	 the	 carbon	
atom	by	a,	and	the	four	hydrogen	atoms	by	b,	c,	d,	and	e,	we	obtain	a	structure	ST	
with	 the	 domain	 { , , , , }U a b c d e= 	and	 the	 relation	 r ={< a,b >,  < b,a >,  < a,c >,
 < c,a >,  < a,d >,  < d ,a >,  < a,e >,  < e,a >} ,	 which	 can	 be	 interpreted	 as	 ‘being	
connected	 by	 a	 covalent	 bond’.	 Alternatively,	 however,	 one	 could	 just	 as	 well	
choose	bonds	as	objects	and	consider	the	relation	‘sharing	a	node	with	another	
bond’.	Denoting	the	bonds	by	 ', ', 'a b c and	 'd ,	we	obtain	a	structure	 S 'T 	with	the	
domain	  U ' ={a ',b ',c ',d '} 	and	 the	 relation	  r ' ={< a ',b ' >,  < b ',a ' >,  < a ',c ' >,
 < c ',a ' >,  < a ',d ' >,  < d ',a ' >, 	  < b ',c ' >, 	  < c ',b ' >, 	  < b ',d ' >,  < d ',b ' >,  < c ',d ' >,
 < d ',c ' >} .	 	 Obviously	 ST 	and	 S 'T 	are	 not	 isomorphic.	 So	 which	 structure	 is	
picked	out	depends	on	how	the	system	is	described.	Depending	on	which	parts	
one	 regards	 as	 individuals	 and	 what	 relation	 one	 chooses,	 very	 different	






are	 any	 number	 of	ways	 in	which	 the	 system	 considered	 as	 a	whole	 could	 be	
carved	 up.	 Regarding	 the	 objects	 in	 the	 system	 the	 scientist	 could	 count	
individual	 rabbits	 as	 above.	 Or	 she	 could	 take	 pairs	 of	 rabbits	 as	 the	 relevant	
objects.	Or	she	could	count	rabbit	legs	(perhaps	she	is	interested	in	selling	them	
as	 lucky	charms).	Or	she	could	count	rabbit	hairs,	or	rabbit	 teeth.	Or	she	could	
take	 individual	 molecules	 in	 the	 system	 to	 form	 the	 basic	 objects	 and	 define	
elaborate	structures	on	a	massive	set	containing	them.	For	any	target	system	the	
question	of	what	to	take	as	the	objects	and	the	relations	is	a	substantive	question	
inviting	 multiple	 answers.18		 And	 even	 once	 the	 objects	 are	 fixed,	 there	 is	 no	




thing	 as	 “the”	 structure	 of	 a	 target	 system.	 There	 are	 any	 number	 of	 ways	 of	
picking	out	a	set	of	objects	to	form	the	domain	of	a	structure	of	the	target	system.	
And	 even	 once	 this	 is	 done,	 any	 number	 of	 different	 physical	 properties	 and	






18	Weisberg	 (2013,	 Section	 5.3.1)	makes	 a	 similar	 point	when	 he	 draws	 a	 distinction	 between	









into	 the	 same	 difficulties	 as	 natural	 kinds.	 While	 theories	 may	 play	 a	 role	 in	
identifying	 a	 structure,	 they	 do	 not	 determine	 a	 unique	 structure.	 Newtonian	
mechanics,	for	instance,	instructs	us	to	identify	objects	and	the	forces	acting	on	




So	we	 are	 still	 faced	with	 the	 above	 identification	 problem.	 If	 the	 relationship	
between	 target	 systems	 and	 their	 structures	 is	 not	 one	 of	 brute	metaphysical	
fact,	and	if	the	same	target	system	has	multiple	structures,	then	when	someone	
proposes	 a	 structure-preserving	 mapping	 between	 a	 target	 structure	 and	 a	
mathematical	 structure,	 how	 are	 we	 to	 determine	 which	 of	 those	 target	
structures	are	being	 invoked?	Without	an	answer	 to	 this	question	 it’s	not	clear	




it	 is	 incomplete.	 “Immersion”	 is	 a	metaphor	 that	 needs	 to	 be	 unpacked.	 Their	
presentation	seems	to	suggest	that	once	a	theoretical	background	is	assumed	a	
relevant	 structure	 emerges	 in	 a	 relatively	 unproblematic	 manner,	 and	 those	
interested	in	the	applicability	of	mathematics	can	take	this	structure	for	granted	
without	probing	further	into	its	nature	and	origins.19		The	considerations	in	this	
section	 show	 that	 there	 is	more	 to	 the	 problem	of	 the	 attribution	 of	 structure	
than	 meets	 the	 eye	 at	 first	 glance.	 There	 is	 a	 serious	 issue	 where	 the	 initial	








generating	 a	 target	 structure.	 In	 essence,	 we	 propose	 that	 for	 the	 mapping	
account	 to	 get	 off	 the	 ground,	 a	 scientist	 has	 to	 describe	 the	 target	 system	 in	
physical	 terms,	 and	 then	 by	 abstracting	 away	 to	 the	 extension	 of	 such	 a	
description,	generate	a	target	structure	to	anchor	an	application	of	mathematics.		
	
The	 solution	 to	 the	 problem	 we	 have	 been	 addressing	 follows	 from	 a	 careful	
analysis	 of	 the	 above	 cases.	 Recall	 the	 scenario	 that	 the	 scientist	 is	 faced	with	
when	 applying	mathematics	 to	 a	 population	 of	 rabbits.	We	described	different	
ways	she	might	do	this,	ways	that	involved	selecting	different	parts	of	the	system	
as	objects	and	identifying	different	physical	properties	and	relations	as	relevant	
depending	 on	 her	 purpose	 at	 hand.	 In	 doing	 so	 she	 provided	 what	 we	 call	
																																																								
19See	Bueno	and	Colyvan’s	(2011,	p.	347)	quoted	above.	As	discussed,	Bueno	and	Colyvan	allow	











and	 relations.	 In	 the	 above	 examples	 these	were	 physical	 relations	 that	
held	between	 interbreeding	 rabbits,	descriptions	of	 the	 rabbits’	 fur,	 and	
so	on.	














account	 to	 get	 a	 grip	 on.	 Recall	 from	 Section	 3	 that	 a	 set-theoretic	 structure	




of	 objects.	 If	Ds	 talks	of,	 say,	 five	 rabbits	 (and	pinpoints	 them	by	picking	out	 a	
particular	 rabbit	 as	 the	 first	 rabbit,	 another	one	as	 the	 second	 rabbit,	 etc.),	we	
now	 remove	 “rabbits”	 from	 this	 description	 and	 only	 keep	 “objects”	 (and,	
possibly,	 a	 numbering	 of	 them	 as	 the	 first	 object,	 the	 second	 object,	 etc.).	 The	
relations	 get	 stripped	 of	 their	 physical	 nature	 by	 replacing	 them	 with	 their	















material	properties	of	 the	object	until	we	are	 left	with	objects	 that	are	nothing	
but	 objects,	 and	 relations	 that	 are	 nothing	 but	n-tuples	 of	 nothing-but-objects.	
But	 unlike	 Wittgensteinian	 ladders,	 which	 can	 be	 thrown	 away	 once	 we’ve	
reached	the	top,	abstraction	ladders	have	to	remain	in	place.	First,	Ds	specifies	to	
what	 the	 structure	 is	 applied.	 The	 description	 Ds	 anchors	 the	 application	 of	
structure	ST	to	the	target,	and	without	Ds	the	application	has	been	lost	because	if	
we	remove	Ds	from	the	picture	we	are	left	with	nothing	but	an	abstract	structure.	
Second,	 Bueno	 and	 Colyvan’s	 third	 step	 requires	 us	 to	 “interpret	 the	
mathematical	consequences	that	were	obtained	in	the	derivation	step	in	terms	of	
the	 initial	 empirical	 set	 up”	 (op.	 cit).	 This	 is	 impossible	without	Ds	(or	 at	 least	
some	description	of	the	target	system	in	physical	terms).	If	we	throw	the	ladder	
away,	we	cannot	climb	down	any	more	and	bring	mathematical	results	back	to	
the	 domain	 of	 application.	 For	 these	 reasons	 a	 structure	ST	 applies	 to	 target	T	
always	only	relative	to	a	structure	generating	description	Ds,	and	the	phrase	of	
“applying	S	to	T”	should	be	seen	as	an	ellipse	for	“applying	S	to	T	relative	to	the	




One	 might	 ask	 when	 in	 the	 process	 we	 have	 outlined	 we	 enter	 the	 realm	 of	
mathematics:	 is	 it	when	we	transition	 from	Ds	 to	Ds	 (and	with	 it	 to	ST	),	or	 is	 it	
when	 ST	 	 is	 connected	 to	SM	 through	 a	 suitable	morphism?	 The	 answer	 to	 this	
question	 depends	 on	how	 strictly	 one	 characterises	 “mathematics”,	 and	where	
one	puts	the	emphasis.	If	one	takes	any	use	of	set	theory	to	be	mathematics,	then	
the	application	happens	in	the	transition	from	Ds,	via	Ds,,	to	ST.	This	seems	to	be	
suggested,	 for	 example,	 by	Malament	 (1982,	 pp.	 529-532)	 in	 his	 discussion	 of	
whether	 Field	 (1980)	 is	 entitled	 to	 use	 sets	 of	 spacetime	 points	 in	 his	
“nominalist”	 reconstruction	 of	 Newtonian	 gravity.	 Under	 a	 stricter	 reading	 of	
“mathematics”,	where	one	asks	at	what	point	the	sorts	of	structures	studied	by	
mathematicians	(e.g.	those	that	appear	in	differential	geometry	or	linear	algebra)	




the	 application	 of	 mathematics.	 Ultimately	 both	 senses	 are	 legitimate	 and	 a	
choice	 between	 them	 depends	 on	 one’s	 interest	 and	 other	 philosophical	
commitments.		
		
So	 our	 answer	 to	 the	 general	 application	 problem	 is	 the	 following.	 A	
mathematical	 structure	 SM	 applies	 to	 a	 target	 T	 iff	 a	 structure	 generating	
description	Ds	of	T	is	given	which,	through	a	process	of	abstraction,	is	turned	into	







morphism	 between	 SM	 and	 ST	 	 (and	 possibly	 further	 mathematical	 structures)	
can	be	spelled	out	on	a	case-by-case	basis	by	 the	mapping	account’s	answer	 to	
the	special	applicability	problem.	As	such,	once	Ds	has	done	its	job	and	generated	





limited	 to	 this	 kind	 of	 application.	 An	 important	 place	 where	 mathematics	 is	
applied	 to	 the	 physical	 world	 is	 in	 fundamental	 measurement,	 and	 on	 closer	
inspection	 it	 turns	 out	 that	 representation	 theorems	 in	 the	 representational	
theory	 of	 measurement	 are	 a	 good	 place	 to	 see	 our	 approach	 in	 action.22	
Consider	a	simple	example	where	the	system	in	question	is	a	collection	of	rods.	
The	scientist	can	describe	the	system	in	a	way	that	takes	the	individual	rods	to	
be	 the	objects	 in	 the	system,	and	a	 length	comparison	between	 them	to	be	 the	
relevant	 physical	 relation.	 This	 way	 of	 looking	 at	 the	 system	 provides	 the	
following	structure	generating	description:	
	












This	 description	 specifies	 a	 structure	 ST	 with	 the	 domain	U={o1,	…,	on}	 and	 the	
relation	set	R={r}	of	relations	on	U.	Thus,	Dl	generates	ST=<U,	R>	via	Dl.		
	
This	 structure	 can	 now	 be	 embedded	 in	 other	 more	 elaborate	 structures.	
Different	 structures	 can	 be	 chosen,	 and	 different	morphisms	 can	 be	 used.	 For	
instance,	let	 〈!,≥〉 	be	the	set	of	the	natural	numbers	with	the	relation	≥ 	(greater	
than	or	 equal)	 defined	on	 them.	To	 apply	 the	 structure	 〈!,≥〉 	to	 the	 system	of	
rods	the	scientist	has	to	propose	that	there	is	a	mapping	 f :U → N 	such	that:	
																																																								
21	In	our	example	of	the	dynamics	of	a	population	this	allows	for	embedding	mappings	between	





22	The	 classic	 source	 is	Krantz	 et.	 al’s	 (1971).	Brown	 (1999,	Ch.	 4)	offers	 an	 introduction;	Diez	
(1997a,	1997b)	provides	an	overview	of	the	development	of	the	theory.	
23	Those	who	worry	 that	 labeling	 rods	with	 numbers	 is	 already	 an	 application	 of	mathematics	





ox ,oy ∈U : 〈ox ,oy 〉 ∈r ↔ 〈 f (ox ), f (oy )〉 ∈≥ .	
	
If	 this	condition	 is	met	by	 f,	 then	we	can	say	that	the	application	of	 the	natural	
numbers	to	the	system	of	rods	is	successful	and	the	scientist	can	use	facts	about	




the	 right	 structures	 and	 morphisms,	 and	 there	 are	 deep	 and	 interesting	
questions	 there.	 What	 matters	 in	 the	 present	 context	 is	 that	 constructing	 the	
structure	  〈U , R〉 	involved	 choices	 for	 the	 scientist	 at	 every	 step:	 a	 choice	
concerning	the	objects	 in	the	system;	a	choice	concerning	the	relevant	physical	
properties	and	relations;	and	a	choice	concerning	how	the	former	instantiate	the	
latter.	We	are	 led	astray	 if	we	think	that	 〈U , R〉 	simply	drops	out	of	 the	system	
because	 it’s	 somehow	 “natural”.	 〈U , R〉 	may	 seem	 natural	 because	 there	 are	
significant	 choices	 available	 to	 the	 scientist	 “upstream”	 of	 the	 application	 of	
mathematics,	choices	that	the	description	generating	the	structure	respects.	But	






Dm:	“The	 target	 system	contains	 rods	o1,	…,	 on	and	 some	have	property	of	rm	=	
being	made	out	of	mahogany	and	others	rb	=	being	made	out	of	out	of	birch.”	
	
Dc:	 “The	 target	 system	 contains	molecules	 o1	 ,	…,	 om,	 some	 of	 which	 have	 the	




have	a	unique	 “natural”	 structure	 that	 the	 scientist	 somehow	picks	up.	Rather,	










Second,	 there	 is	 also	 no	 expectation	 that	 we	 have	 access	 (either	 by	 direct	
















proposed	 mathematical	 structure.	 We	 take	 it	 that	 many	 cases	 in	 fundamental	
physics	 take	 this	 form.	The	atoms	 in	 a	 crystal	 are	 located	at	 a	 certain	distance	
from	each	other;	molecules	are	said	to	have	certain	size;	particles	in	the	standard	




Could	 there	 be	 cases	 where	 mathematics	 is	 “applied”,	 and	 yet	 no	 physical	













Notice	 that	 such	 a	 description	 looks	 remarkably	 like	 a	 Ramsey-sentence,	 as	
associated	with	some	versions	of	epistemic	structural	realism	(for	an	overview	
see	 Frigg	 and	Votsis’	 (2011)).	On	 this	 view	 it’s	 not	 simply	 that	we	don’t	 know	
about	the	“nature”	of	the	objects	and	relations	in	the	world,	but	we	cannot	even	
describe	 them.	 In	 such	 cases	 we	 face	 a	 potential	 application	 of	 mathematics,	
which	becomes	an	application	proper	once	the	physical	descriptions	are	offered.				
	
In	 the	 latter	 case	 no	 physical	 description	 is	 given	 and	 it	 is	 assumed	 that	 none	
exists,	even	in	principle.	In	such	a	case	it	seems	inappropriate	to	us	to	talk	about	
“applying”	mathematics	to	a	target.	Mathematics	is	used	to	generate	claims	about	








told	 in	order	 to	know	which	 data	are	 relevant	 for	which	 theory”	 (ibid.,	 p.	100).	
These	 observations	 were	 not	 intended	 as	 contributions	 to	 a	 discussion	 of	 the	
general	application	problem.	However,	they	are	made	in	contexts	where	the	use	








we	developed	 in	 the	 last	 section	 relates	 to	other	 issues	 in	 connection	with	 the	
application	of	mathematics.	Let	us	 first	 return	 to	 the	explanation	problem	 that	
we	 introduced	 in	 Section	 2	 and	 then	 set	 aside.	 Bueno	 and	 Colyvan	 argue	 that	
simple	 versions	 of	 the	 mapping	 account	 have	 difficulty	 accounting	 for	
mathematical	explanations.24	They	argue	as	follows:	
	
“If	mathematics	 is	 genuinely	 explanatory,	 however,	 this	will	 present	 a	 serious	
problem	 for	 the	mapping	account.	The	problem	 is	 simply	 that	 it	 is	hard	 to	 see	
how	a	mere	representational	system	can	provide	explanations	and	yet	that	is	the	








from	 playing	 a	 role	 in	 explanations.	 A	 representation	 can	 contain	 information	
that	 is	 explanatorily	 relevant.	 The	 London	 tube	 map,	 for	 instance,	 does	 not	
explain	why	 one	 cannot	 get	 directly	 from	 Brixton	 to	 Stratford.	 But	 it	 contains	
information	that	 is	explanatorily	relevant,	namely	that	 the	two	stations	are	not	
on	 the	 same	 line.	 In	 a	 similar	 vein,	 a	 mathematical	 structure	 may	 contain	
information	 that	 is	 explanatorily	 relevant	 even	 though	 the	 structure	 as	 such	 is	
not	 an	 explanation.	 Depending	 on	 one’s	 account	 of	 explanation	 one	 will	
recognise	 different	 pieces	 of	 information	 as	 explanatorily:	 counterfactual	
dependence,	 law-like	 connections,	 causal	 relations,	 the	 use	 of	 unificatory	
patterns,	and	so	on.	 Information	of	 this	kind	can	be	encoded	in	a	mathematical	
formalism,	and	by	connecting	 the	 formalism	to	 the	 target	 the	mapping	account	
makes	 this	 information	 relevant	 for	 a	 target	 system.	 In	 this	 way	 the	mapping	
account	 is	 indeed	 an	 important	 ingredient	 in	 any	 mathematical	 explanation	
because	without	a	mapping	a	mathematical	 formalism	would	be	 “free	 floating”	
and	 have	 no	 bearing	 on	 the	 target	 in	 question.	Hence,	while	 a	 structure	 that’s	
mapped	 to	 target	 is	 not	 ipso	 facto	 an	 explanation,	 the	 existence	 of	 such	 a	
																																																								
24	Recall	 that	 Bueno	 and	 Colyvan	 describe	 their	 account	 as	 an	 “inferential”	 conception	 of	 the	








is	 nominalism.	 By	 anchoring	 structures	 in	 physical	 descriptions,	 aren’t	 we	
implicitly	 committing	 to	nominalism?	There	are	 two	observations	 that	 seem	to	
pull	 into	 that	 direction.	 The	 first	 is	 that	 by	 anchoring	 structures	 in	 something	
physical	 we	 reduce	 structures	 to	 the	 physical	 and	 hence	make	 them	 obsolete.	
This	is	too	quick.	Firstly,	although	the	structure	of	a	target	may	be	anchored	to	a	
physical	description,	our	account	does	not	preclude	 the	existence	of	 structures	
not	 so	 anchored	 –	 the	 structures	 proposed	 to	 be	 appropriately	 morphic	 to	 a	











mapping	 account	 as	 the	 invocation	 of	 a	 proposed	 morphism	 between	 the	
structure	of	the	target	system	and	a	mathematical	structure,	and	our	account	of	
structure	 generating	 descriptions	 provided	 a	 story	 for	 how	 the	 former	 is	
generated.	What	becomes	of	our	response	to	the	general	application	problem	if	
one	 changes	 the	 philosophy	 of	 mathematics	 and	 doesn’t	 subscribe	 to	




For	 a	 Platonist,	 mathematics	 is	 the	 study	 of	 mathematical	 objects:	 the	 natural	









per	 se:	 mathematics	 is	 the	 study	 of	 systems	 of	 syntactic	 objects	 and	 rules	 for	












feature	 in	 the	 interpretations	 (this	 is	 reminiscent	 of	Hilbert’s	 remark	 that	 in	 a	
proper	axiomatisation	of	geometry	 “one	must	always	be	able	 to	 say,	 instead	of	
‘points,	 straight	 lines,	 and	 planes’,	 ‘tables,	 chairs,	 and	 beer	 mugs’”).26	Similar	
considerations	 apply	 to	 what	 Shapiro	 (1983,	 pp.	 529-531)	 calls	 “postulate	





For	 the	 intuitionist,	 mathematical	 statements	 are	 about	 mathematical	 objects,	
but	these	are	mental	constructs.	How	to	think	about	mathematical	application	in	
this	framework	is	not	straightforward,	but	one	possibility	it	is	to	adopt	a	Kantian	
perspective	 whereby	 the	 human	 mind	 plays	 an	 active	 role	 in	 perceiving	 and	
understanding	the	world	(Shapiro	1983,	p.	533).	Our	Ds	 then	don’t	describe	an	
objective	world,	but	describe	a	world	as	perceived	and	understood	by	a	human	






of	 mathematics	 adopted,	 one	 would	 hope	 that	 applications	 of	 mathematics	
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